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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD C. TEAGUE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Case No. 8232 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN 
~~KD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
~11ATE OF UTAH, and :MILTON 
C. BRANDON, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Defendants are able to agree with the facts as stated 
in plaintiff's brief as far as accuracy of the matters 
stated is concerned. However, the facts as stated are not 
complete in all details pertinent, and defendants, there-
fore, make the following additional statement of per-
tinent facts. 
The record reveals that counsel for defendant Bran-
don in the Civil Case No. 99973, filed a notice of intention 
to move for the entry of default. In the notice, it is re-
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cited that the Affidavit, Notice, AffidaYit of l\failing and 
Complaint were actually served on the plaintiff, Howard 
C. Teague, at his address, Route 1, :Mooresboro, North 
Carolina. Exhibit "~" in the san1e case, reveals that the 
notice was actually served on the 24th day of October, 
1953, the exhibit being a return receipt frmn the United 
States Post Office Department. 
?)), 
Tl 
Exhibit "1" is a photostatic copy of the 1\Iotor Ye- 1 ~DI 
hicle Accident Report showing the result of the investiga-
tion by State Highway Patrolman D. C. Jenner. It re-
veals that the automobile owned by plaintiff and involved 
in the accident in which defendant Brandon was injured, 
was a 1948 :Mercury Coupe automobile with a 1952license ] 
plate, #571540, frorn the State of North Carolina. The 
san1e accident report reveals that Teague's address was 
Deseret Chmnical Depot. The affidavit of counsel for 
plaintiff and the testimony of said attorney, reveals that 
he had no personal knowledge of the intentions or resi-
dence of Howard C. Teague (R-14, 21). 
Deseret Che1nical Depot is a rnited States military 
reservation, the address of which is Tooele County, rtah. 
No evidence was submitted that Teague ever resided at 
any place other than on the I'"nited States 1nilitary reser-
vation. The affidavit of 1nailing recites that the last 
lmown address of plaintiff Teague was "Sgt. Howard C. 
!!nl 
\1 
.! 
Teague, Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele County, Utah. -, 
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STATE.MENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE RESIDENCE OF A PERSON IS A FACTUAL QUES-
TION. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT TEAGUE 
WAS A NONRESIDENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
ARGU1IENT 
POINrr I. 
THE RESIDENCE OF A PERSON IS A FACTUAL QUES-
TION. 
vVhether or not a person is a resident or nonresident 
of the State of ('" tah is a question of fact which must be 
decided by the trier of the fact on the evidence which is 
presented for his consideration. This basic and funda-
mental proposition seeins to be undisputed by the plain-
tiff and the cases "·hich he cites all are concerned with 
resolving the basic proposition of whether or not the 
evidence presented forms a basis for the finding as made. 
Examples of this basic consideration are illustrated 
by plaintiff's brief. The case of Suit t,·. Shailer, 18 Fed. 
568, which is cited at pages 7 and 14 of plaintiff's brief, 
was concerned with an examination of the facts surround-
ing the establishment of a residence. In examining this 
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question, the Court states that the facts 1nust be examined 
to see whether or not the person wa~ in good faith a rt>~i­
dent of the State in which he was sued as a nonresident 
and then stated as follows, page 571: 
,.,:;, * * Thus, in Shaeffer v. Gilbert, supra, the 
~Iaryland Court of Appeals, in discussing the 
characteristics of residence for the exercise of 
political rights, said (page 71 of 73 J\Id., 20 A. 
434, 435): 'It does not n1ean, as we have said, 
one's pern1anent place of abode, where he intends 
to live all his days, or for an indefinite or un-
lin1ited time; nor does it Inean one's residence for 
a temporary purpose, with the intention of re-
turning to his fonner residence when that purpose 
shall have been accon1plished, but means, as we 
understand it, one's actual home, in the sense of 
having no other home, whether he intends to re-
side there permanently, or for a definite or in-
definite length of time.' The f.;upreme Court of 
:Jiassachusetts, by Chief Justice Rugg, in Jenkins 
v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 i\fass. 440, 17S 
N.E. 644, 646, in defining the term 'residence' in 
a statute requiring registration of nwtor vehicles, 
said : ' "Residence'' means in general a personal 
presence at s01ne place of abode with no present 
intention of definite and early renwval and with a 
purpose to remain for an undetennined period, not 
infrequently but not necessarily c01nhined with a 
design to stay permanently'." 
The courts of California have on several occasions 
examined questions of residency as far as military per-
sonnel are concerned. These California decisions all 
den1onstrate that the pri1nary question is a question of 
fact to be determined by the trier of the fact on evidence 
:l~ 
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presented to him. ~~rhe most recent case which defendants 
discover is the case of Briggs v. Superior Court of Ala-
meda County, 81 Cal. App. 2nd 240, 183 Pac. 2nd 758. 
In the Briggs case, the nonresident motorist statute was 
under consideration. The daimed nonresident was a man 
who had been a member of the naval service but had since 
been discharged to civilian life. A considerable amount of 
evidence was presented concerning the intentions and 
desires of the person it was claimed was a nonresident. 
The length of time the person stayed within the State 
of California; the place where he resided; whether or not 
he registered his car in California; whether or not he 
moved his wife and furniture to California; and all the 
other facts surrounding the sojourn in California were 
discussed. 'The Court determined that Briggs was 'a non-
resident even though he had established a place of resi-
dence and was residing within the State of California at 
the time of the collision giving rise to the lawsuit against 
him. 
The test used in California is that the residency n1ust 
be more than just a temporary stay within the State, it 
must be a stay of an indefinite length with intention to 
make a home. The Stttit v. Shailer case cited by plaintiff 
and many other authorities, including prior California 
cases, were examined. One of the cases examined in the 
Briggs case is Berger r. Sup£Yrior Court, 79 Cal. App. 
~d ±25, 179 Pac. 2nd 600, which sets down the basic rules 
governing the determination of whether or not a person 
is a resident. 'The general principles applicable are set 
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down with particularity and defendants submit that those 
principles are applicable to the case at bar. The Cali-
fornia ~\ppellate Court stated the principles as follows, 
page 601: 
"Respondent points out that Section 404 d<ws 
not contain any definition of the term 'nonresi-
dent' and argues that the general laws of Cali-
fornia n1ust be consulted for the purpose of de-
tennining whether a person is a resident or non-
resident within the meaning of said section. NPc-
tion 2-13 and 2-1--t of the Government Code provide 
as follows: 
'Every person ha:-:, in la\\·, a residence. 
• In determining the place of residence the 
following rules are to be obserYed: 
'(a) It is the place where one remains 
when not called elsewhere for labor or other 
special or ten1pora.ry purpose, and to which 
he returns in seasons of repose. 
'(b) There can only be one residence. 
' (c) A residence can not be lost until 
another is gained. ~~ 
* * * * 
'(g) The residence can be changed only 
by the union of act and intent.' 
"Counsel for respondent argues that a change 
of residence is obtained hv act and intent and 
that the 1nere fact that a ·soldier in the armed 
forces was stationed at a place and lived there 
did not establish such place as his residence. He 
argues further that a soldier has no choice as to 
his dwelling place and that the fact that he re-
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mains in any one place for a considerable length 
of tin1e is merely a fortuitous circumstance. He 
cites the case of Johnston v. Benton, 73 Cal. App. 
565, at page 569, 239 P. 60, at page ·62, where the 
court said: 
'It is well settled that the domicile of a 
person is in no way affected by his enlist-
ment in the civil, n1ilita.ry, or naval service 
of his country; and he does not thereby aban-
don or lose his domicile which he had when 
he entered the service, nor does he acquire 
one at the place where he serves. 9 R.C.L. 
551; Ste,vart Y. Kyser, 105 Cal. 459, 39 P. 19; 
People ex rel. Budd v. Holden, 28 Cal. ( 123) 
1:2±; Estate of Gordon, 142 Cal. 125, 75 P. 
672; Percy Y. Percy, 188 Cal. (765) 768, 207 
P. 369. True, the fact of his being on military 
duty does not preclude him, if he so desires, 
from establishing residence where he is sta-
tioned (Percy v. Perc~-, supdt); but the un-
contradicted evidence here is that such wa~ 
not Benton's desire - that he never had any 
intention of doing so'." 
The cases cited both hy plaintiff and defendant dem-
onstrate beyond refutation that the question of whether 
or not a person is a resident or nonresident is one of fact 
to be determined by the trier of the fact based on the evi-
dence submitted. Defendants submit that such is the 
undisputed law applicable to the case at bar. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT TEAGUE 
WAS A NONRESIDENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
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The facts recited by both the brief of plaintiff and 
the brief of defendant were largely undisputed. It would 
appear that the following are salient undisputed fach; 
for consideration by this Court. 
1. That Ho-ward C. Teague at all tirnes he \vas pres-
ent in the State of Utah \Vas a rnernber of the United 
States Armed Forces. 
:2. That at all times Howard C. Teague was within 
the State of lTtah, he actually lived on the Deseret Chemi-
cal Depot, a rnilitary reservation located in Tooele Coun-
ty, Utah. 
3. That Howard C. Teague was driving an automo-
bile which he owned and which was registered in the 
State of North Carolina and carr~nng Korth Carolina 
license plates. 
±. That Howard C. Teague returned to the State 
of :North Carolina, his hon1e, and was residing there at 
the tirne plaintiff con1n1enced his action in the State of 
Utah. 
5. That there is no evidence that Howard C. Teague 
ever intended to n1ake the State of Vtah his home or to 
re8ide within the State of Utah pernranently or for any 
indefinite length of time. 
6. That there is no evidence that Howard C. Teague 
ever lived at any place other than a military reservation 
under jurisdiction of the United States while present 
within the State of Utah. 
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The recited propositions are uncontradicted and are 
the basis for a finding by the trier of the fact that How-
ard C. Teague was not a resident of the State of Utah 
but was, in fact, a nonresident within the 1neaning of 
that term as it is used in the "1\Iotor Yehicle Code. 
~rhe fundamental difference between plaintiff and 
defendants' concept of the problem confronting this 
Court involves the significance of actual presence within 
the boundaries of the State. Fnder military order, such 
presence is involunhu~, and temporary. Defendants sub-
mit it is not sufficient to support any inference that the 
soldier intends to be a resident. It has always been the 
law that a soldier or sailor does not acquire a new resi-
cL•nce merely hy being stationed at a particular place. 
His residence reinains the same as when he entered the 
service unless there is shown a clear and une(1uivocal 
intention to change residence. I~wtc Island r. Firrnwll's 
Fwzd Indemnity CoJIIpan.u, 30 Cal. 2nd 3-l-1, 18-± Pac. :2nd 
153, 17:1 A.L.R. 896; Commercial Credit Cor1J. u. 8}}/ith, 
1S7 S.\Y. 2nd 3G3, 158 A.L.R. 1-±7-1-. See also discussion 
under Point I of Berger v. SII}Jerior Court (supra) pages 
3, 6 and 7. 
~rhe proposition of residence of persons in the Armed 
Forces has been the subject of a lengthy and exhaustive 
annotation which is contained in 1-l-8 A.L.H. commencing 
at page 1-t 13. All of the cases cited in the annotation seem 
to agree on one basic and fundamental proposition. It is 
that the 1uere presence of a soldier or ;-;ailor within the 
State on a military reservation is not evidence of inten-
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tion to change his residence fron1 the plaet> of induction [roi 
to the place where he i~ stationed on lnilitary duty. rrJtprp [~ 
n1ust be shown an unequivocal and clear intention that ~a 
a change of residence occur. In the absence of the show- ilie 
ing of a clear and unequiyocal intention, the residence J)P' 
of the soldier or ~ailor ren1ains the n·sidence which he !UO) 
had at the c01n1nencement of his n1ilitary duty. il!ri 
Applying these principles to the undisputed fad~ 
recited, it appears that there is no showing of any inten-
tion on the part of plaintiff Teague to change his resi-
dence fron1 the State of N" orth Carolina to the State of 
Utah. The evidence is to the contrary and :-;hows a clear 
and unequivocal intention not to change his residence. 
Teague had his automobile registered within the State 
of North Carolina. and it was so registered at the time 
of the accident injuring defendant Brandon. He returned 
to the State of North Carolina where he was actually 
served with the papers required to perfect service on 
nonresidenb. The facts are mnply sufficient to provide 
a. basis for the finding by the Court that Howard C. 
Teague was a nonresident of the State of rtah on August 
-+, 1952 and that the statutes of the State of Utah permit-
ting the se1Tice on ~reague hy service on the Secretary 
of State were applicable. 
Plaintiff cites and relies heavily on the case of Booth 
r. Crockett, District Judge, 110 Ptah 336, 173 Pac. 2nd 
G-:!7, and submits that this Court's detennination of the 
1neaning of the words "usual place of abode" and "resi-
.k· 
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dence" should be the same. He requests the Court to 
decide that a person in the Armed Services stationed 
within the State of Utah autmnatically is a resident of 
the State of Utah. This proposition defendants submit 
is palpably falicious. In the Booth decision, this Court 
adopted the meaning of "place of abode" which had been 
attributed to those words by the Supreme Court of N e'v 
.Jersey. In its decision, the Court cites Grant r. Lazc-
rcuce, 37 L"tah -!50, 108 Pac. 931, 933. rrhe language there 
quoted was from the K ew J erse~, case of J/ ygaU c. Coe, 
63 X .. J'.L. :J10, 51:?, -!-! A. 198. The Booth decision also 
recites and quotes the later case of !{w-illa r. Roth, 13:2 
X .. J.L. 213, 38 A. :?nd 862. The definition which had been 
set forth for "place of abode" in X ew Jersey was much 
more restrictive than is used for the definition of the 
word ''residence.'' The cases in N" ew Jersey and Booth 
c. C ro(Iett, all sa~, that "place of abode" means the place 
where the person is actually living and abiding at the 
time service is attempted. The residence need not be 
the placl' where the person is actuall~, residing and abid-
ing and ma~,, in fact, he some other place than the place 
the peTson is aetually located. The restrictive meaning 
of the phrase "place of abode" is unmistakenly set forth 
in this Court's decision in Booth L Crockett. The langu-
age is as follows, page 649: 
'' 'The Statute does not direct service to Le 
made, at the 'residence' of the defendant, hut at 
his dwelling house or usual place of abode, which 
is a 1nuch more resh·icted term. .\ s was said in 
Stout v. Leonard, 37 N .• J.L. -!92, Iwln~, persons 
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have ~everal residenc-Ps, which tllPy permanPntly 
1naintain, occupying one at one period of the year 
and one at another period. \Vhere such conditions 
exist, a sumnwns nm~t be serve at tlze dwelliu[! 
house in 1rhicl1 the defendant is lh·in.rJ at the time 
uJzen sen_:icc i.s made.' 
"That is, where a person abides-lives-at 
the particular time when the sun1mons is served, 
constitutes his usual place of abode. A similar 
question ·was before the Supre1ne Court of the 
United States in Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. (503) 
at page 508, 23 L. Ed. 398, where it is held that, 
where service of summons is required to be made 
at the 'usual place of abode' such service, in order 
to constitute legal service, 1nust be 1nade at the 
defendant's 'then present residence.' In othe1· 
1rords, at the place where the defendant then lives 
or abides.' (Italics ours) 
"(1) \Ye think the interpretation given the 
phrase 'usual place of abode' in Grant v. Law-
rence, supra, is correct. \V e must assume the 
legislature used the phrase advisedly. Had it 
1neant 'residence' or 'domicile' it would have used 
one of those terms as it n1ust have been well aware 
of the 1neanings which the courts have given those 
words. The usual place of abode of a person is 
where he usually lives or abides. 
"Under the rule of Grant v. Lawrence, ~upra, 
the question in this case becomes: \Y as Frank 
Fairbanks lirhi{J at his parents' home on Decem-
her 13, 19-1-5, when thr copy of the su1n1nons was 
left there1 
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''li--,rank joined the navy and eight days before 
the copy of the summons was left at the Fairbanks 
home departed from this state to start training 
at a navy base in California. Before entering the 
navy and departing for duty, his ordinary activi-
ties of living were centered around and focused 
at his parents' home. He usually ate and slept 
there. He returned to his parents' home after 
short trips. His clothes and personal belongings 
were there and he was tied to that home by ties of 
blood and affection. He was ordinarily physically 
present at the place or was expected there in a 
short time. In short, Frank was living at the 
Fairbanks home prior to his departure for navy 
service." 
Defendants submit that this Court should not decide 
that the mere length of time which the person may ac-
tually be within the State should be the criterion of 
whether or not he is a resident or nonresident. F'or the 
Court to make such a decision, the defendants submit 
would requue every case to he decided on whether or 
not the claimed nonresident stayed within the State a 
sufficient number of days to cast doubt on the effacy of 
service under our Motor Vehicle Code provision. The 
facts of this case demonstrate the dangers of such an 
interpretation. A person with the proper intent and 
actually living within the State of rtah could establish 
his residence here by a very short stay, while a person 
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without the proper intent could be present for years and 
rernain a nonresident during the whole period that he 
stayed within the State of Utah. 
All of the cases seern to adopt the proper test, 'vhich 
is: Did the person who is clairned to be a resident actually 
intend to n1ake the State of Utah his horne f \Vhen apply-
ing this test to the facts on which Judge Yan Cott made 
his decision, it is subnritted that there can be only one 
lawful detel'lnination. It is that the evidence supports 
the trial court's determination that Howard C. Teague 
was a nonresident of the State of Utah on the .fth day of 
August, 1952, at the tirne of the accident in which Bran-
don was injured. It is further subnritted that there is no 
evidence, either substantial or otherwise, which would 
support a finding that Teague was a resident of the State 
of Utah and intended to rnake his horne here on August 
4, 1952. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants subn1it that the detel'lnination of resi-
dency or nonresidency is a question of fact and that the 
trial court properly determined that Howard C. Teague 
was a nonresident on August 4, 1952. This deternrination 
is supported by substantial evidence and therefor this 
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Court should dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff filed 
in the above entitled Court and should determine that the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for 
Nalt Lake Count~~ had jurisdiction over plaintiff, Howard 
C. rreague, and that Ca~e No. 99973 may be pursued to 
its ultimate determination. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RA \VLIXG~, \VALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK:, 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Counsel for Defendarnts 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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